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Abstract
Exposing diverse subword segmentations to
neural machine translation (NMT) models of-
ten improves the robustness of machine trans-
lation. As NMT models experience various
subword candidates, they become more ro-
bust to segmentation errors. However, the
distribution of subword segmentations heav-
ily relies on the subword language models
from which erroneous segmentations of un-
seen words are less likely to be sampled. In
this paper, we present adversarial subword reg-
ularization (ADVSR) to study whether gradi-
ent signals during training can be a substitute
criterion for choosing segmentation among
candidates. We experimentally show that our
model-based adversarial samples effectively
encourage NMT models to be less sensitive
to segmentation errors and improve the robust-
ness of NMT models in low-resource datasets.
1 Introduction
Subword segmentation is a method of segment-
ing an input sentence into a sequence of subword
units (Sennrich et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2016; Kudo,
2018). Segmenting a word to the composition of
subwords alleviates the out-of-vocabulary problem
while retaining encoded sequence length compactly.
Due to its effectiveness in the open vocabulary set,
the method has been applied to many NLP tasks in-
cluding NMT (Gehring et al., 2017; Vaswani et al.,
2017; Devlin et al., 2019; Yang et al., 2019).
Recently, Byte-Pair-Encoding(BPE) (Sennrich
et al., 2016) has become one of the de facto sub-
word segmentation methods. However, as BPE
segments each word into subword units determinis-
tically, NMT models with BPE always observe the
same segmentation result for each word and often
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Ours 
De petites fenêtre_s , une taille dés human isant_e .
Subword Segmentation of the Input 
De petites f_en_ê_pre_s , une tail_e dés human isant_e .
De petites fenêtres, une taille déshumanisante.
Small windows, dehumanizing scale.
De petites fenêpres, une taile déshumanisante.
Small chicks, a dehumanizing carve.
Small fentress, a dehumanizing tail.
Small windows, a dehumanizing size.
Figure 1: An NMT model often suffers from unseen
subword segmentations due to the typos (e.g., charac-
ter swap) in the input text. Ours can correctly translate
the noisy text while Base (standard training) SR (sub-
word regularization) cannot. ‘ ’ denotes a separator
between segmented subwords.
fail to learn diverse morphological features. In this
regard, Kudo (2018) proposed subword regular-
ization, a training method that exposes multiple
segmentations using a unigram language model.
As a result, other applications including NMT
adopted subword regularization for the robustness
of their models (Kim, 2019; Drexler and Glass,
2019; Mu¨ller et al., 2019).
However, subword regularization relies on the
subword unigram language model to sample seg-
mentation candidates. This causes NMT models to
experience only limited sets of subword segmen-
tations which are mostly observed in training sets.
Thus, NMT models trained with the subword reg-
ularization can also fail to inference the meaning
of unseen or noisy words having unseen segmen-
tations. Figure 1 shows an example of a segmenta-
tion error from typos and the translation result from
each model. This issue can be particularly problem-
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atic for low resource languages where many mor-
phological variations are not present in the training
data.
In this work, we explore a different sampling
strategy for the subword segmentations using
gradient signals. We introduce a simple train-
ing method called adversarial subword regular-
ization (ADVSR) to raise resilience against un-
seen segmentations or segmentation errors. We
adopt the adversarial training framework (Good-
fellow et al., 2014; Miyato et al., 2016; Ebrahimi
et al., 2017; Cheng et al., 2019) to search for a sub-
word segmentation. Our proposed method greedily
searches for an adversarial subword segmentation
which will likely incur the highest loss for each
training sample. Our experiment shows that the
NMT models trained with ADVSR consistently
outperform the stochastic subword regularization
at a maximum of 2.2 BLEU scores in standard
benchmark datasets including IWSLT and MTNT.
We also show that our model is highly robust to
input typos.1
2 Background
Subword Regularization Subword regulariza-
tion (Kudo, 2018) exposes multiple subword can-
didates during training via on-the-fly data sampling.
Proposed training method optimizes the parameter
set θ with marginal log-likelihood:
L(θ) =
N∑
n=1
Ex∼Pseg(x|X(n))
y∼Pseg(y|Y (n))
[logP (y|x; θ)] (1)
where x and y are sampled segmentations from the
sentence X and Y through the unigram language
model Pseg(·). However as the exact optimization
of Eqn. 1 is intractable, a finite number of samples2
are used during training.
The probability of a tokenized output is obtained
by the product of each subword’s occurrence prob-
ability, where subword occurrence probabilities
are attained through the Bayesian EM algorithm
(Dempster et al., 1977; Liang et al., 2007; Liang
and Klein, 2009). Segmentation output with maxi-
mal probability is acquired by using Viterbi algo-
rithm (Viterbi, 1967).
Adversarial Regularization in NLP Adversar-
ial samples are constructed by corrupting the origi-
nal input with a small perturbation which distorts
1Our code will be publicly available.
2A single sample is used for each train step.
the model output. Miyato et al. (2016) adopted
the adversarial training framework to the task of
text classification, where input embeddings were
perturbed with adversarial noise rˆ:
e′i = Exi + rˆi (2)
where, rˆ = argmin
r,‖r‖≤
{`(X, r, Y ; θ)} (3)
E is an embedding matrix, e′i is an perturbed em-
bedding vector, and `(·) is log-likelihood obtained
with the input embeddings perturbed with noise
r. As it is computationally expensive to exactly
estimate rˆ in Eqn. 3, Miyato et al. (2016) resorts
to the linear approximation method (Goodfellow
et al., 2014), where rˆi is approximated as follows:
rˆi = 
gi
‖g‖2 , gi = ∇ei − `(X,Y ; θ) (4)
where  indicates the degree of perturbation and gi
denotes a gradient of the loss function with respect
to a word vector. Moreover, Ebrahimi et al. (2017)
extended adversarial training framework to directly
perturb discrete input space, i.e. character, through
the first-order approximation by the use of gradient
signals.
3 Approach
Our motivation is that relying on the likelihood
criterion obtained from the training data exposes
limited sets of subword candidates, hence hinders
the NMT model in the consistent understanding for
diverse segmentations from the word. We conjec-
ture that this may harm the translation quality of
the NMT models when morphological variations
occur.
Therefore, we propose a simple training method
that exposes diverse, but adversarial segmentation
candidates through the use of gradient signals that
can effectively regularize the NMT model. Our
method seeks adversarial segmentations on-the-fly,
thus the model chooses the subword candidates that
are vulnerable to itself according to the state of the
model at each training step.
3.1 Problem Definition
Our method generates a sequence of subwords by
greedily replacing the word’s original segmentation
to that of adversarial ones estimated by gradients.
Given a source sentence X and a target sentence
Y , we want to find the sequence of subwords xˆ and
yˆ which incurs the highest loss:
xˆ, yˆ = argmin
x∈Ω(X)
y∈Ω(Y )
{`(x, y; θ)} (5)
Ω(·) denotes all the tokenized output candidates
given the raw input text and `(·) denotes log-
likelihood. We utilize gradients of translation loss
concerning each subwords’ embeddings for seek-
ing adversarial segmentation candidates (Goodfel-
low et al., 2014; Miyato et al., 2016).
Our method operates on a word unit split by
whitespaces, which consists of subwords. Thus, we
define si1:k as the k subword units constituting the i-
th word’s segmented result xi. For example, as for
the i-th word ”lovely”, its tokenized output ”love”
and ”ly” will be si1 and s
i
2 respectively. Then, we
define the embedding of the word segmentation and
its corresponding gradient vector as the aggregation
of k subwords consisting it:
e(xi) = f([e(s
i
1), . . . , e(s
i
k)]) ∈ Rd (6)
gxi = f([gsi1
, . . . , gsik
]) ∈ Rd (7)
where, gsij = ∇e(sij) − `(x, y; θ) ∈ R
d (8)
where e denotes the embedding lookup operation,
d denotes the hidden dimension of embeddings
and j as one of k. We simply use the element-
wise average operation for the aggregation for f
in Eqn. 6, 7. Therefore if the segmentation of the
word changes, the corresponding embedding and
gradient vector will change accordingly.
3.2 Adversarial Subword Regularization
As it is intractable to select the most adversarial
sequence of subwords, we greedily search for word-
wise adversarial segmentation candidates. We ap-
proximately seek for the adversarial segmented re-
sult of a i-th word from the sentence X by fol-
lowing criteria which was originally proposed by
Ebrahimi et al. (2017) and was used in other appli-
cations (Cheng et al., 2019; Wallace et al., 2019)
xˆi = argmin
xi∈Ω(Xi)
gTx˜i · [e(x˜i)− e(xi)] (9)
where Eqn. 9 approximately seeks the word’s seg-
mented output xˆi which maximizes the loss. xi
represents one of the tokenized output among the
possible candidates given raw text Xi, and x˜i de-
notes an original segmentation of i-th word with
maximal probability.
We uniformly select words in the sentence at
a certain probability and replace them into adver-
sarial subwords’ composition respectively. The
ratio of words to replace into adversarial subwords
is dependent on its sentence length, where we
perturbed in-between quarter to third depending
on the dataset. For generating the segmentation
candidates per word, we use sentencepiece tok-
enizer (Kudo, 2018) and set the maximal number
as 8. We seek the adversarial subword sequence for
both the source sentence and the target sentence.
Note that we only need a single gradient calculation
for generating the sentence of adversarial subwords
for both the source and the target sentence.
The existing adversarial training methods in the
NLP domain generally trains the model with both
the original samples and the adversarial samples
(Miyato et al., 2016; Ebrahimi et al., 2017; Cheng
et al., 2019; Motoki Sato, 2019). However, we
trained the model with only the adversarial samples
for the sake of fair comparison with the baselines.
4 Experimental Setup
4.1 Datasets and Implementation Details
We conduct experiments on a low-resource multi-
lingual dataset, IWSLT3, where unseen morpholog-
ical variations outside the training dataset can occur
frequently. We also test NMT models on MTNT
(Michel and Neubig, 2018) which is a testbed for
evaluating the NMT systems on noisy text scrapped
from Reddit. We use the English-French language
pair dataset. Table 1 summarizes the statistics of
the datasets. Furthermore, for evaluating the robust-
ness of the trained NMT models to the typos, we
generate synthetic test data with typos that people
often make. We utilize the NMT models trained
on a clean benchmark dataset for evaluation of the
MTNT (Michel and Neubig, 2018) and the syn-
thetic dataset.
For all experiments, we use Transformer-Base
(Vaswani et al., 2017) as a backbone model and
follow the same regularization and optimization
procedures by Vaswani et al. (2017) where we
trained with joined dictionary of the size 16k. Our
implementation is based on Fairseq.4
3http://iwslt.org/
4https://github.com/pytorch/fairseq
Dataset Lang Pair
Number of sentences
(train/valid/test)
IWSLT17 FR↔ EN 232k / 890 / 1210
AR↔ EN 231k / 888 / 1205
IWSLT15 CS↔ EN 105k / 1553 / 1327
VI ↔ EN 133k / 1553 / 1268
IWSLT13 TR↔ EN 132k / 887 / 1568
PL ↔ EN 144k / 767 / 1564
MTNT1.1 FR→ EN 19k / 886 / 1022 (1233)
EN→ FR 35k / 852 / 1020 (1401)
Table 1: Data statistics. The number in the parenthe-
ses denotes the number of sentences in the MTNT2019
test set which was provided by the WMT Robustness
Shared Task (Li et al., 2019)
4.2 Evaluation
For inference, we use a beam search with a beam
size of 4. For evaluation, we used the best
checkpoint which performed best in the validation
dataset. We evaluated translation quality through
BLEU (Papineni et al., 2002) computed by Sacre-
Bleu (Post, 2018)5.
Our baselines are the NMT models trained
with deterministic segmentations having maxi-
mum probability, and the subword regularization
method (Kudo, 2018). We set the hyperparame-
ters of subword regularization equivalent to that
of Kudo (2018)6. We will denote the former as
BASE and the latter as SR . Byte Pair Encoding
(Sennrich et al., 2016) is not used as the baseline
model since the performance is almost the same as
to that of BASE according to Kudo (2018).
5 Experiments
5.1 Main Results
Table 2 shows the main results on standard bench-
mark datasets. Our method improves over the
BASE and the SR consistently. This shows that
diversely exposing various segmentations is more
effective than making the NMT models observe
limited sets of segmentation candidates in the low-
resource setting. Specifically, ADVSR maximally
improves 2.2 BLEU over SR and 3.5 BLEU over
BASE in the English to Czech dataset. We assume
that the large gains are due to the linguistic charac-
teristic of Czech, which is morphologically rich.
Generally, our method shows its effectiveness
when the source languages are morphologically
complex. The performance improvement over the
5SacreBLEU signature: BLEU+case.lc+lang.[src-lang]-
[dst-lang]+numrefs.1+smooth.exp+tok.13a+version.1.4.2
6l=64, alpha=0.1
Lang Pair BASE SR ADVSR
IWSLT17
FR→ EN 37.9 38.1 38.7
EN→ FR 38.8 39.1 39.9
AR→ EN 31.7 32.3 33.3
EN→ AR 14.4 14.3 14.7
IWSLT15
CS→ EN 28.9 30.5 32.0
EN→ CS 20.4 21.7 23.9
VI→ EN 28.1 28.4 29.0
EN→ VI 30.9 31.7 32.3
IWSLT13
PL → EN 19.1 19.7 20.9
EN→ PL 13.5 14.1 15.1
TR→ EN 21.3 22.6 23.4
EN→ TR 12.6 14.4 14.0
Table 2: BLEU scores on the main results. Bold in-
dicates the best score and all scores whose difference
from the best is not statistically significant (with p-
value of 0.05). (Statistical significance is computed via
bootstrapping (Koehn, 2004))
Dataset BASE SR ADVSR
MTNT2018
FR→ EN 25.7 27.6 27.2
EN→ FR 26.7 27.5 28.2
MTNT2018 + FT
FR→ EN 36.5 37.9 38.8
EN→ FR 33.2 34.4 35.3
MTNT2019
FR→ EN 27.6 29.3 30.2
EN→ FR 22.8 23.8 24.1
MTNT2019 + FT
FR→ EN 36.2 38.1 38.6
EN→ FR 27.6 28.2 28.9
Table 3: BLEU scores on the out-of-domain MTNT
dataset. FT denotes finetuning with the MTNT2018
training dataset.
baselines in in-domain datasets can be explained
by the robustness to unseen lexical variations, i.e.
compound words, where shortage of training data
can evoke the problem. Our method effectively ex-
poses vulnerable and diverse subword candidates
to the NMT model by not relying on subword uni-
gram language model trained on the train dataset.
5.2 Results on Out Domain Datasets
For evaluating robustness to the out-of-domain dis-
tribution, we evaluate the NMT models trained
with clean benchmark datasets on the out domain
benchmark dataset, MTNT (Michel and Neubig,
2018). We use the training and validation datasets
Method 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
FR→ EN
BASE 30.7 25.6 20.3 16.2 11.4
SR 33.2 28.5 23.3 18.7 14.7
ADVSR 34.8 32.0 29.2 25.7 22.2
EN→ FR
BASE 31.1 24.2 18.6 14.6 10.6
SR 34.2 27.8 23.9 18.9 14.4
ADVSR 35.1 30.3 26.4 23.0 19.1
Table 4: BLEU scores on the synthetic dataset of typos.
The column lists results for different noise fractions.
of MTNT 2018 version for finetuning our model.
We finetune each NMT model with a correspond-
ing training method that was conducted on the
IWSLT17 dataset where we finetuned 30 more
epochs from each models’ best checkpoints.
Table 3 shows the results of the NMT models
evaluated on the MTNT test. Generally, exposing
multiple segmentation candidates improves robust-
ness to the out-of-domain dataset compared to ex-
posing the deterministic tokenized outputs. NMT
models trained with the proposed method shows
improvement over the baselines, by maximally im-
proving 0.9 BLEU score over the SR and 2.5 BLEU
score over the BASE.
5.3 Results on Synthetic Dataset
Additionally, we conduct an experiment to see the
change of translation quality according to various
noise levels. We synthetically generated 3 types
of noise, 1. character drop, 2. character swap,
3. character insert and perturbed each word with
the given noise probability.
Table 4 shows the result. As the noise fraction
increases, our method shows its high robustness
compared to the baseline models maximally im-
proving 10.8 BLEU scores over BASE, and 7.5 over
SR. This verifies that our method effectively im-
proves the robustness of the NMT models against
segmentation errors from typos.
6 Related Work
Subword segmentation has been widely used since
Byte-Pair-Encoding (Sennrich et al., 2016) was pro-
posed. Kudo (2018) introduced subword regular-
ization and other segmentation methods have been
propose as well (Creutz and Lagus, 2005; Schuster
and Nakajima, 2012; Chitnis and DeNero, 2015).
Recently, the BPE-dropout (Provilkov et al., 2019)
was introduced, which enables the stochastic seg-
mentation of the BPE. Also, there is another line
of research that utilizes character-level segmenta-
tion (Luong and Manning, 2016; Lee et al., 2017;
Cherry et al., 2018).
Other works explored generating synthetic or
natural noise for regularizing NMT models (Be-
linkov and Bisk, 2018; Sperber et al., 2018;
Karpukhin et al., 2019). Michel and Neubig (2018)
introduced a dataset scrapped from Reddit for test-
ing the NMT systems on the noisy text. Recently,
a shared task on building the robust NMT models
was held (Li et al., 2019; Be´rard et al., 2019).
Our method extends the adversarial training
framework, which was initially developed in the
vision domain (Goodfellow et al., 2014) and has be-
gun to be adopted in the NLP domain recently (Miy-
ato et al., 2016; Samanta and Mehta, 2017; Mo-
toki Sato, 2019; Wang et al., 2019; Cheng et al.,
2019). Miyato et al. (2016) first adopted the adver-
sarial training framework on text classification by
perturbing embedding space with continuous ad-
versarial noise. Wang et al. (2019) and Motoki Sato
(2019) extended the corresponding method to reg-
ularize the language models and the NMT models
respectively. Their methods regularize neural mod-
els by perturbing embedding space, whereas our
model perturbs the discrete input space. Cheng et al.
(2019) introduced adversarial training framework
by discrete word replacements where candidates
were generated from the the language model. How-
ever, our method does not replace the word but
replaces its subword composition. Therefore dis-
tortion is not perceived in the context of adversarial
attack.
7 Conclusion
In this study, we propose adversarial subword regu-
larization which virtually augments training data by
exposing diverse segmentations using gradient sig-
nals. As shown in our experiments, sampling seg-
mentations from subword unigram language might
bias NMT models to frequent segmentations in the
training set and make them vulnerable to unseen
lexical variations. Our method effectively improves
the robustness of the NMT models to unseen seg-
mentations, especially in low-resource settings.
Acknowledgement
This research was supported by National Research
Foundation of Korea (NRF-2017R1A2A1A17069
645, NRF-2017M3C4A7065887).
References
Yonatan Belinkov and Yonatan Bisk. 2018. Synthetic
and natural noise both break neural machine transla-
tion. In ICLR.
Alexandre Be´rard, Ioan Calapodescu, and Claude
Roux. 2019. Naver labs europe’s systems for the
wmt19 machine translation robustness task. In
WMT.
Yong Cheng, Lu Jiang, and Wolfgang Macherey. 2019.
Robust neural machine translation with doubly ad-
versarial inputs. In ACL.
Colin Cherry, George Foster, Ankur Bapna, Orhan
Firat, and Wolfgang Macherey. 2018. Revisiting
character-based neural machine translation with ca-
pacity and compression. In EMNLP.
Rohan Chitnis and John DeNero. 2015. Variable-
length word encodings for neural translation models.
In EMNLP.
Mathias Creutz and Krista Lagus. 2005. Unsupervised
morpheme segmentation and morphology induction
from text corpora using Morfessor 1.0. Helsinki
University of Technology Helsinki.
Arthur P Dempster, Nan M Laird, and Donald B Rubin.
1977. Maximum likelihood from incomplete data
via the em algorithm. Journal of the Royal Statisti-
cal Society: Series B (Methodological), 39.
Jacob Devlin, Ming-Wei Chang, Kenton Lee, and
Kristina Toutanova. 2019. Bert: Pre-training of deep
bidirectional transformers for language understand-
ing. In NAACL-HLT.
Jennifer Drexler and James Glass. 2019. Subword reg-
ularization and beam search decoding for end-to-end
automatic speech recognition. In ICASSP. IEEE.
Javid Ebrahimi, Anyi Rao, Daniel Lowd, and Dejing
Dou. 2017. Hotflip: White-box adversarial exam-
ples for text classification. In ACL.
Jonas Gehring, Michael Auli, David Grangier, Denis
Yarats, and Yann N Dauphin. 2017. Convolutional
sequence to sequence learning. In ICLR.
Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian
Szegedy. 2014. Explaining and harnessing adversar-
ial examples. In ICLR.
Vladimir Karpukhin, Omer Levy, Jacob Eisenstein, and
Marjan Ghazvininejad. 2019. Training on synthetic
noise improves robustness to natural noise in ma-
chine translation. In W-NUT.
Gyuwan Kim. 2019. Subword language model for
query auto-completion. In EMNLP.
Philipp Koehn. 2004. Statistical significance tests for
machine translation evaluation. In ACL.
Taku Kudo. 2018. Subword regularization: Improving
neural network translation models with multiple sub-
word candidates. In ACL.
Jason Lee, Kyunghyun Cho, and Thomas Hofmann.
2017. Fully character-level neural machine transla-
tion without explicit segmentation. In TACL.
Xian Li, Paul Michel, Antonios Anastasopoulos,
Yonatan Belinkov, Nadir Durrani, Orhan Firat,
Philipp Koehn, Graham Neubig, Juan Pino, and Has-
san Sajjad. 2019. Findings of the first shared task on
machine translation robustness. In WMT.
Percy Liang and Dan Klein. 2009. Online em for unsu-
pervised models. In ACL.
Percy Liang, Slav Petrov, Michael I Jordan, and Dan
Klein. 2007. The infinite pcfg using hierarchical
dirichlet processes. In EMNLP-CoNLL.
Minh-Thang Luong and Christopher D. Manning. 2016.
Achieving open vocabulary neural machine transla-
tion with hybrid word-character models. In ACL.
Paul Michel and Graham Neubig. 2018. Mtnt: A
testbed for machine translation of noisy text. In
EMNLP.
Takeru Miyato, Andrew M. Dai, and Ian Goodfel-
low. 2016. Adversarial training methods for semi-
supervised text classification. In ICLR.
Shun Kiyono Motoki Sato, Jun Suzuki. 2019. Effective
adversarial regularization for neural machine transla-
tion. In ACL.
Mathias Mu¨ller, Annette Rios, and Rico Sennrich.
2019. Domain robustness in neural machine trans-
lation. In arxiv.
Kishore Papineni, Salim Roukos, Todd Ward, and Wei-
Jing Zhu. 2002. Bleu: a method for automatic eval-
uation of machine translation. In ACL.
Matt Post. 2018. A call for clarity in reporting bleu
scores. In WMT.
Ivan Provilkov, Dmitrii Emelianenko, and Elena Voita.
2019. Bpe-dropout: Simple and effective subword
regularization. In arxiv.
Suranjana Samanta and Sameep Mehta. 2017. Towards
crafting text adversarial samples. CoRR.
Mike Schuster and Kaisuke Nakajima. 2012. Japanese
and korean voice search. In ICASSP.
Rico Sennrich, Barry Haddow, and Alexandra Birch.
2016. Neural machine translation of rare words with
subword units. In ACL.
Matthias Sperber, Jan Niehues, and Alex Waibel. 2018.
Toward robust neural machine translation for noisy
input sequences. In ACL.
Ashish Vaswani, Noam Shazeer, Niki Parmar, Jakob
Uszkoreit, Llion Jones, Aidan N. Gomez, Lukasz
Kaiser, and Illia Polosukhin. 2017. Attention is all
you need. In NeurIPS.
Andrew Viterbi. 1967. Error bounds for convolutional
codes and an asymptotically optimum decoding al-
gorithm. IEEE transactions on Information Theory.
Eric Wallace, Shi Feng, Nikhil Kandpal, Matt Gardner,
and Sameer Singh. 2019. Universal adversarial trig-
gers for attacking and analyzing nlp. In EMNLP.
Dilin Wang, Chengyue Gong, and Qiang Liu. 2019.
Improving neural language modeling via adversarial
training. In ICLR.
Yonghui Wu, Mike Schuster, Zhifeng Chen, Quoc V.
Le, Mohammad Norouzi, Wolfgang Macherey,
Maxim Krikun, Yuan Cao, Qin Gao, Klaus
Macherey, Jeff Klingner, Apurva Shah, Melvin John-
son, Xiaobing Liu, Lukasz Kaiser, Stephan Gouws,
Yoshikiyo Kato, Taku Kudo, Hideto Kazawa, Keith
Stevens, George Kurian, Nishant Patil, Wei Wang,
Cliff Young, Jason Smith, Jason Riesa, Alex Rud-
nick, Oriol Vinyals, Greg Corrado, Macduff Hughes,
and Jeffrey Dean. 2016. Google’s neural machine
translation system: Bridging the gap between human
and machine translation. CoRR.
Zhilin Yang, Zihang Dai, Yiming Yang, Jaime Car-
bonell, Ruslan Salakhutdinov, and Quoc V Le. 2019.
Xlnet: Generalized autoregressive pretraining for
language understanding. In NeurIPS.
